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DEFINING THE FEDERAL AND STATE REALMS
OF TENDER OFFER REGULATION
ROBERT B. THOMPSON*
The current wave of corporate takeovers has rekindled the long-run-
ning debate over the federalization of state corporation law.1 Tradition-
ally state law has regulated the relationship between shareholders and
directors within a corporation. The federal securities laws affect that re-
lationship through required disclosure and prohibitions against fraud,
but do not disturb the primacy of state control. The Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green2 confirmed this
federal/state balance when it rejected efforts to interpret fraud under the
federal securities laws as encompassing shareholder complaints of man-
agement misconduct. The Court based its decision, in part, on a reluc-
tance to federalize a substantial part of state corporation law.
Some recent judicial decisions3 interpreting the Williams Act,4 the fed-
eral tender offer legislation, present a different vision of the appropriate
* Professor of Law, Washington Univ.; B.A., Vanderbilt Univ.; J.D., University of Virginia.
Research for this article was supported in part by a grant from the Center for the Study of American
Business, Washington University. Larry Ribstein read an earlier version of this article and Kevin
Barrett of the Washington University class of 1987 provided research assistance.
A condensed version of this article appears in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
(M. Weldenbaum ed. 1987).
1. Previous debate over the federalization of state corporation law centered on proposals for
federal chartering of corporations based in part on the perceived inability of states to give appropri-
ate protection to shareholders against possible abuses by managers and others. See, e.g., Cary, Fed-
eralism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Schwartz, A Case
for Federal Chartering of Corporations; 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976). During the 1960's and early
1970's, even without new legislation, federal courts gave expansive readings to federal law, particu-
larly the ubiquitous rule lOb-5 to provide federal remedies for management overreaching of share-
holders. See note 191 and accompanying text. By the late 1970's this movement had dissipated.
Congress enacted no new federal legislation. In addition, the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), ended judicial efforts to interpret broadly ex-
isting federal securities laws to replace existing state regulation of internal corporate relationships.
Similar debates have occurred in other eras. See, eg., Stevens, Uniform Corporation Laws
Through Interstate Compacts and Federal Legislation, 34 MICH. L. REv. 1063 (1936); 69-4 FTC
Utility Corporations, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
2. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
3. See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 90-4393, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f) &
78n(d)-(f) (1982). See infra Section IIA of this Article, for a discussion of the purposes of the
Williams Act.
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role of state and federal regulation. These courts read the Williams Act
and the commerce clause of the Constitution 5 as mandates to protect the
"market for corporate control" against state interference.6 In particular,
these courts found that federal law preserves for shareholders the right to
use a tender offer to oust corporate management. Initially, this broad
vision of the federal regulatory role did not threaten the primacy of state
regulation in the realm of shareholder-director relations because the state
takeover laws that courts declared unconstitutional addressed only the
responsibilities of a bidder who seeks to buy the shares of target company
shareholders.7 However, state takeover laws passed in the wake of these
decisions have been inserted into existing state corporations codes and
regulate takeovers by modifying the relative rights of shareholders and
directors.8 Therefore, attacks on these "second generation" statutes, re-
quire courts to decide the extent to which the federal securities laws sup-
plant state corporation law.
The Supreme Court has before it in the current term a case challenging
the constitutionality of a second generation takeover statute.9 The Rea-
gan administration and Congress are also struggling to determine the
proper federal role as they decide whether to impose federal regulation
relating to "poison pills," "greenmail," or "golden parachutes," defen-
sive tactics currently regulated under state law or left to the market."
This extended battleground intensifies the need to identify the principles
that define the appropriate realms of federal and state law.
This Article suggests that the division of state and federal authority
over tender offers can best be understood by distinguishing the regulation
of economic activity that occurs across markets from the regulation of
5. U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
6. See, eg., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 663 (1982). Professor Henry Manne devel-
oped the concept of the market for corporate control in the mid-1960's, see Manne, Some Theoretical
Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964), and it has since become a key term in
economic concepts of how firms operate.
7. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
9. Indiana v. Dynamics Corp. of America, No. 86-97,prob.juris, noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
Editor's Note:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision in this case shortly before publication of this article. Its
effect is discussed in a postscript to this article, infra, p. 1000.
10. See generally The Effect of Mergers on Management Practices, Cost, Availability of Credit
and the Long Term Viability of American Industry, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 609, 635 (1985) (statement
of Joseph R. Wright expressing administration views on corporate takeovers).
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economic activity within a firm.1 1 State corporation law traditionally has
governed activity within a firm. Each state's corporation code and its
judicially applied common law of fiduciary duty determine the legal rela-
tionship between directors and shareholders. The proxy,12 periodic dis-
closure, 13 and antifraud provisions14 of the federal Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 assist shareholders in monitoring the performance of their
managers and thereby affect the shareholder-director relationship. But
these federal provisions do not purport to change the substance of the
relationship between shareholders and their managers that state law has
created.1 5
States differ in the extent to which they protect shareholders against
director action. For example, California tends to give more protection to
shareholder interests, while Delaware's corporations act gives more free-
dom and flexibility to managers. In theory, leaving regulation of the
shareholder-director relationship to state law permits the states to com-
pete for corporate charters;16 each acting as a laboratory within our fed-
11. Economic theory makes a similar distinction. See Coase, The Nature of the Firm in
ECONOMICA, NEW SERIES VOL. IV 386, 388 (1937). The exact nature and significance of that
distinction and the reasons for the existence of firms has been much debated. See, eg., Alchian &
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777
(1972). Recent economic literature views a corporation as a nexus of contracts, posing the question
as to how relationships inside a firm are different from relationships that are outside a firm. See
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
Without attempting a precise articulation of how these relationships may differ, I argue in this
Article that congressional allocation of federal and state responsibilities in the corporate and securi-
ties area reflects this difference in the means chosen by the parties to structure their economic activ-
ity. In particular, it reflects a distinction between regulation of the shareholder/manager
relationship and regulation of discrete market transactions such as the purchase and sale of securi-
ties. Cf Ribstein, The Scope of Federal Securities Liability for Corporation Transactions, 33 Sw. L.J.
1129, 1164 (1980). Professor Ribstein distinguishes between market and corporate transactions in
determining the reach of federal liability for nondisclosure. He suggests that because of the greater
federal regulation of market participants and market transactions, federal liability connected with
market transactions need not be limited to breach of disclosure duty even though federal liability in
connection with corporate transaction would be more limited.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982).
13. Id. at § 781.
14. Id. at § 78j(b).
15. One federal law which does impose nondisclosure obligations on directors is section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act, id. at § 78p(b). It requires officers, directors and shareholders owning more than 10
percent of a company's stock to turn over to the corporation any profit made on the purchase and
sale of the corporation's stock within a six month period.
16. See, e.g., Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 251 (1977). This article is discussed in more detail infra, text accompanying notes
164-67.
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eral system to develop legal rules for corporate governance that best
facilitate the raising of capital. If a state designs its corporate code to
favor "home-town" management at the expense of shareholders, the
market will view that state's corporations as less attractive investment
vehicles and the state will lose incorporations to other states.
In discrete market transactions occurring outside the corporate form,
the federal government has assumed a substantially greater role. State
blue sky laws regulate the sale of securities, but these individual state
laws are limited to sales occurring within each state.17 The key regulator
of interstate issuance of securities is federal law, the Securities Act of
1933,18 passed in the first one hundred days of the New Deal, in part
because of state inability to regulate national distributions involving
stock sales in various states.19 Similarly, federal law provides the domi-
nant regulation of market participants, even though state law also affects
these persons and entities.20 In both areas, federal law imposes substan-
tive regulation without the same deference to state law found in intracor-
porate relationships.
Tender offer regulation inevitably combines the two types of regulation
just discussed. Tender offers involve both discrete market transactions
between parties in different states and dramatic alterations in share-
holder-director relations within a corporation. A federal rule would be
appropriate to regulate transactions between a bidder and target com-
pany shareholders who may be located in all fifty states. However, to the
extent that tender offers provide an alternative to derivative suits, proxy
fights, or other voting mechanisms by which shareholders monitor their
managers pursuant to state law,21 state tender offer regulation is
appropriate.
17. All states regulate the purchase and sale of securities by statutes that are commonly called
blue sky laws. See generally, L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIEs AcT (1976).
A minority of states go beyond the disclosure approach and impose merit regulation. See, e.g.,
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 581-10 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1987) (securities commissioner author-
ized to deny trading if the security is not "fair, just or equitable"). The issue is often hotly debated.
See generally Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in Merit Regulation, 1976 Wisc. L. REV. 79.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1982).
19. See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 105-07 (2d ed. 1961).
20. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, h, k, o (1982) (regulating the activities of broker-dealers).
21. See generally Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: 4 Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984) (describing vari-
ous means of monitoring management; disciplines generated by the market for corporate control is
sufficiently limited that it can serve only as a remedy of last resort for massive managerial failure and
not as the principal enforcer of corporate accountability).
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The functions of state and federal regulation of tender offers are clearly
interrelated. The possibility of a tender offer in the marketplace makes
shareholder rights against management under state law more effective.
Conversely, if shareholders have limited rights against management
under state law there may be less incentive for a bidder to seek control by
a tender offer. This interrelationship illustrates the complexity of tender
offer regulation. It does not, however, necessarily require a different divi-
sion of federal and state responsibility than that which has existed for the
last half century.
This article analyzes the appropriate roles of federal and state law in
regulating tender offers by first identifying the incomplete view of fed-
eral-state relations found in current case law. Subsequent sections detail
the methods by which states now seek to regulate takeovers and the de-
gree to which these state methods are consistent with federal law.
I argue that the Williams Act was intended to fill a gap in the federal
regulation of change of control transactions.22 Federal law regulates
other kinds of changes of control (e.g., proxy fights, share-for-share ex-
changes and mergers)-all by means of disclosure. Federal law thereby
makes more effective the rights shareholders have under state law, but it
does not create new substantive rights. There is little in the legislative
history of the Williams Act to suggest that Congress intended to change
this pattern of leaving substantive intrafirm regulation to state law. The
Williams Act's extensive regulation of market transactions covered an
area not subject to prior state regulation and does not of itself suggest
that Congress sought to regulate the intrafirm relationship over which
there had been a significant and longstanding state supervision. Simi-
larly, Congressional recognition that overregulation of the bidder might
frustrate existing state intrafirm remedies23 does not imply that Congress
22. See 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) ("The need for such legislation has been caused by the
increased use of cash tender offers rather than the regular proxy fight to gain control of publicly
owned corporations... [t]his legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the
federal securities laws ... ") (remarks of Senator Williams); see also S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
23. Some supporters of the Williams Act saw federal regulation of shareholder-bidder transac-
tions as helping management fend off corporate raiders. See, eg., 113 CONG. REC. 24665 (1967)
(remarks of Senator Kuchel); 113 CONG. REC. 857 (1967) (remarks of Senator Kuchel). Yet, the
legislative debates illustrates a congressional concern that too much regulation of the shareholder-
bidder relationship could have an undesired effect on shareholder-manager relations. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 22; see also Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate
Takeover Bids, Hearings on S. 510 Before Subcomm. on Securities of Banking and Currency Commit-
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intended to create new substantive intrafirm remedies for shareholders
vis-a-vis management.
Congress could provide substantive intrafirm remedies if it so chose;
under the Constitution Congress presumably has the power to promul-
gate a federal law of corporation.24 In fact, there have been calls for
additional federal laws regarding tender offers.21 If the market for corpo-
rate control is so much more important to shareholders than voting
rights, litigation rights or other means by which they can monitor their
managers, or if the market for corporate control cannot effectively be
regulated by "parochial" states there may be a need for federal legisla-
tion. Unless an intent to protect the market for corporate control or
some similar intent is found in the legislative history of the Williams Act,
it seems an unwarranted extension of current federal law to read the Wil-
liams Act as creating substantive federal rights for shareholders against
their managers.
I. THE CONFLICTING AND INCOMPLETE VIEW OF FEDERALISM IN
CURRENT CASE LAW
Hostile takeovers have produced more case law and commentary in
recent years than any other corporate law topic. Yet the cases and the
commentary present a confused and often inconsistent view of the appro-
priate role of the federal and state governments in regulating takeovers.
This confusion can be seen, for example, in the report of the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers
which recommended that state corporation law should continue to gov-
ern the response by a target's management to a tender offer, while at the
same time proposing new federal regulations that would restrict state in-
terference with tender offers.26 This Article focuses on similar confusion
tee, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, 115, 120 (1967) (statements of Professors Hayes, Mundheim, Kaplan)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
24. Under the United States Constitution the federal government has only the powers delegated
to it. All other powers are reserved to the states. Given the far-reaching interpretations modem
courts have given to congressional powers under the commerce clause, regulation of corporate and
securities matters it not an area from which the federal government is precluded from regulating.
Thus, the question of federal regulation is principally one of statutory interpretation.
25. See, eg., Fiflis, Of Lollipops and Lawn-A Proposal for a National Policy Concerning Tender
Offer Defenses, 19 U.C.D. L. REv. 303 (1986).
26. For a description of the Advisory Committee's recommendations and the SEC's response,
see Quinn & Martin, The SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers and Its Aftermath-A New
Chapter in Change-of-Control Regulation, in TENDER OFFERS, DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTA-
RIES (M. Steinberg ed. 1985).
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evidenced in two groups of cases interpreting the Williams Act. Cases
ruling on the constitutionality of state takeover laws by-and-large reflect
more restrictive views about state regulation than cases deciding whether
private defensive tactics violate the Act.
A. Edgar v. MITE Corp. and Other Cases Ruling on the
Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes
Between the passage of the Williams Act in 1968 and the Supreme
Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.27 in 1982 three-fourths of the
state enacted their own tender offer statutes.28 In many respects these
statutes emulated the Williams Act: they were aimed at the bidder and
the bidder's transactions with target company shareholders; they re-
quired disclosure, and they imposed similar substantive protections.
However, many states, in an effort to help local companies fend off un-
wanted takeovers, 29 went beyond the Williams Act and provided addi-
tional "protection" to the investor, such as hearings by state officials on
the fairness of the tender offer.30 Because these statutes usually applied
to tender offers for companies with only minimal contacts with the state,
such as having assets or shareholders within a state,31 a takeover bid
involving shareholders across the country would likely be subject to con-
flicting state requirements.
In MITE, the Supreme Court invalidated Illinois' takeover statute as
an impermissible indirect regulation of interstate commerce. 32 A plural-
ity of the Court would have invalidated the statute as a direct regulation
of interstate commerce 33 and as preempted by the Williams Act. 4 Since
27. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
28, Id. at 631 n.6 (1982) (listing 37 state statutes). One state statute, Virginia's, actually pre-
ceded enactment of the Williams Act by a short time.
29. See generally Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political
Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977); Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regula-
tion: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689 (1981).
30. See, e-g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 634-40 (describing provisions of the Illinois statute).
31. See, e.g., id. at 642 (describing the broad extraterritorial effects of the Illinois statute); Great
W United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (describing the same with respect to an Idaho
statute).
32. 457 U.S. at 643-46. Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Powell and Stevens joined
in this part of Justice White's opinion).
33. Id. at 641-43 (Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor and Stevens joined in this part of
Justice White's opinion.)
34, Id. at 634-40. (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in this part of Justice
White's opinion.)
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MITE, lower courts have used all three arguments to strike down state
statutes.
L Preemption/Supremacy Clause Analysis
Under Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution state law
must yield when it conflicts with federal law. Direct conflict is not a
problem because state takeover laws usually are written so that it is phys-
ically possible to comply with the provisions of both the federal and state
acts. But clear precedent also holds that state law must yield to federal
law if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."35 The breadth of the Wil-
hams Act's purpose obviously becomes the key determinant of the role
for state law in regulating takeovers.
There seems to be general agreement in the case law that in enacting
the Williams Act Congress sought to protect investors confronted by a
tender offer by providing them with the information necessary to make a
decision. 6 A state law that interfered with that disclosure clearly would
be preempted. More ambiguity surrounds the extent to which the Act
creates or maintains neutrality between the takeover bidder and the tar-
get management.
The legislative history of the Williams Act is helpful on this point.
The bill Senator Williams originally introduced in 1965 proposed to reg-
ulate the bidder more severely than did the legislation Congress ulti-
mately adopted.37 Before hearings were held on the bill in 1967, for
example, Senator Williams had dropped a provision that would have re-
quired precommencement notification to the target company. 8 These
changes apparently reflected an awareness that too much regulation
would have the undesired effect of discouraging takeovers and thereby
reduce their effectiveness as a check on entrenched management.3 9 Thus,
Congress disclaimed any "intention to provide a weapon for management
35. Id. at 631 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
36. See, ag., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3-4 (1967),
37. See 111 CONG. REc. 28255 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams describing S. 2731); see
also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977) (disclosure provisions originally embod-
ied in S. 2731 "were avowedly pro-management in the target company's efforts to defeat takeover
bids.")
38. See 113 CONG. REC. 854, 855-56 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
39, See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 633 (opinion of White, J.); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 22, at 3.
[Vol. 64:1057
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to discourage takeover bids."'
Nevertheless, the language of the Committee reports and the com-
ments on the floor of Congress permit a debate as to the breadth of this
"4neutrality" policy. Narrowly interpreted, Congress' position reflected a
negative decision, establishing only that Congress did not want to go as
far as the original bill because it would have interfered unnecessarily with
the existing shareholder-management relationship. Under this view, the
bill simply sought to keep federal regulation of bidder-shareholder trans-
actions from making matters worse for the shareholders vis-a-vis their
management. It expressed no judgment as to other causes (e.g., state law
or bylaw or charter amendments) that may interfere with the share-
holder-management relationship.
Interpreted more expansively, Congress' neutrality purpose reflected a
positive decision establishing the correct balance between bidder and
management and between shareholder and management that the states
cannot change.41 Among those who view Congress as having acted to
establish such a balance, further division is possible between i) those who
read the legislative declaration to prevent any conduct, state or private,
that upsets the balance42 and ii) those who suggest that the 1968 balance
may be upset, so long as it is not by new state legislation.43 This latter
interpretation appears to permit private action upsetting the balance, in-
cluding defensive tactics taken by directors pursuant to the broad author-
ity in longstanding provisions of state corporation codes and traditional
common law.
The three justices who made up the plurality in MITE seemed to inter-
pret neutrality broadly. Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated
that "[i]t is also crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect
the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover
40. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
41. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261 (7th Cir.) prob.
juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
42. See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1555
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
43. See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 25, at 329 ("Congress at most seems to have developed a policy
of preserving the relative positions of targets and bidders under federal and state laws, that is without
itself favoring either, or permitting the states to alter the balance of power. Since the target company
defenses were available from the beginning and are not the result of new state legislation, the power
of these defenses was always held by targets and the balance may not now be altered by federal
courts."). See also infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text (discussing the apparent distinction in
the Second Circuit's Data Probe decision between state "legislative regulation" and state law which
imposes fiduciary obligations of a contractual nature).
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bidder."'  He agreed with the Court of Appeals that Congress "sought
to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary
information but also by withholding from management or the bidder any
undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed
choice."45 Thus, Justice White concluded that the Illinois Act was pre-
empted insofar as it provided for a hearing that created the potential for
delay and thereby "upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring
management at the expense of stockholders. '4 6 He further asserted that
the Williams Act preempted the Illinois provision permitting the Secre-
tary of State to pass on the substantive fairness of a tender offer, because
it "offer[ed] investor protection at the expense of investor autonomy-an
approach quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress."'47
Two justices dissented from the plurality view. Justice Stevens did not
find congressional efforts to impose neutral legislation as "tantamount to
a federal prohibition against state legislation designed to provide special
protection for incumbent management."48 Justice Powell argued that
"the Williams Act's neutrality policy does not necessarily imply a con-
gressional intent to prohibit state legislation designed to assure-at least
in some circumstances-greater protection to interests that include but
often are broader than those of incumbent management. 49
44. 457 U.S. at 633. I have refrained from stating that the MITE plurality adopted either
variation of the "broader" position discussed previously in the text. MITE involved only new state
legislation and not private action taken by directors pursuant to authorization in state corporate law
predating the Williams Act.
Proponents of the broader view, of course, see MITE as consistent with their position. See supra
notes 42 & 43. Justice White may have fueled this disagreement by quoting Senator Williams' state-
ment that "[w]e have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales in favor of management or in
favor of the person making the takeover agreement." 457 U.S. at 633 (quoting 113 CONG. REc.
24664 (1967)). When introducing the Williams Act in 1967, Senator Williams phrased the neutrality
policy a bit differently: "Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory
burden in favor of management or in favor of the offeror." 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (emphasis
added). Similarly, the Senate Report states, "[t]he committee has taken extreme care to avoid tip-
ping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid." SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 (emphasis supplied). Read with the emphasis
supplied the Williams Act's "neutrality" would not extend to forbidding private acts and the cases
have so held. See notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
45. 457 U.S. at 634.
46. Id. at 639.
47. Id. at 640 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980)). The plurality
also would have found the Illinois act preempted because it provided for precommencement notifica-
tion. See infra note 68.
48. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
49. Id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
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For the most part, subsequent judicial decisions have followed the plu-
rality.1 Some courts suggest that state regulation is inconsistent with the
federal policy of permitting investors to make their own decisions if the
state law creates barriers that prevent a shareholder from selling into a
market influenced by the presence of a bidder.51 Some, however, have
lingering doubts. For example, Judge Posner has written:
Most courts have agreed that the Williams Act strikes a balance between
target management and tender offeror that the states may not upset .... Of
course it is a big leap from saying that the Williams Act does not itself
exhibit much hostility to tender offers to saying that it implicitly forbids
states to adopt more hostile regulations, but this leap was taken by the
Supreme Court plurality and us in MITE and by every court to consider the
question since.52
2. Direct Regulation of Interstate Commerce
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce and limits the extent
to which the states may regulate such commerce, even if Congress has
not spoken.53 Justice White found the Illinois statute an impermissible
state regulation of interstate commerce citing both its direct and indirect
effects.54 Only three other justices joined in the part of the opinion find-
50. See the cases cited infra notes 51-52. Some courts even treat the plurality opinion as a
holding of the court. See, e.g., Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Ky. 1982).
51. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 759 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd,
796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986); Ichan v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1420 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
52. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261-62 (7th Cir.), prob. juris.
noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
53. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
54. The division between direct and indirect effect was popular earlier in the century. It has
been used less frequently in more recent times, particularly since attacks on that doctrine by Chief
Justice Stone. He felt the distinction provided little guidance in determining when state could per-
missibly regulate economic activity. See, eg., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945);
DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) (Stone, dissenting). See generally G. GUNTHER, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 270 (10th ed. 1980) (direct-indirect approach was in vogue for a time, co-existing
with other doctrines emphasizing purpose or practical effect but the recurring theme has been a
middle ground: the commerce clause by its own force, bars some but not all statute regulation). See
also the repeated use of the "direct" regulation of commerce argument to strike down control share
acquisition statutes in cases cited infra note 97. The Supreme Court continues to use the direct-
indirect framework. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquour Auth.,
106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986) ("This Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to
analyzing state economic regulation under the commerce clause." (citing MITE)); Cf. Maine v. Tay-
lor, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2447-48 (1986) ("This Court has distinguished between state statutes that bur-
den interstate transactions only incidentally and those that affirmatively discriminate against such
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ing an impermissible direct regulation on interstate commerce, but this
part of the opinion has also been followed by several lower courts since
MITE.55 Justice White particularly criticized the fact that the Illinois
Act purported to regulate commerce wholly outside the state. He feared
that if other states imposed similar regulations, "interstate commerce in
securities transactions generated by tender offer would be thoroughly sti-
fled." 56 Courts evaluating second generation statutes might, however, be
reluctant to use this "direct regulation" argument. The courts would
encounter considerable difficulty in separating judicial analysis labeled
direct regulation from the balancing approach applied in commerce
clause cases generally. More importantly, these statutes avoid extraterri-
torial application and, thus, do not raise the possibility of several states
regulating the same transaction.
3. Indirect Regulation of Interstate Commerce
The only part of Justice White's opinion to command a majority found
the Illinois Act unconstitutional under the test of Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. 57 Pike held that when a state statute "regulates interstate commerce
indirectly, the burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive
in relation to the local interest served by the statute."58
Three points in the majority's opinion recur in subsequent court deci-
sions and have important implications when MITE's reasoning is applied
to state corporation law. First, the Court describes as "substantial" the
effect of allowing Illinois to block a nationwide tender offer. Depriving
shareholders of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium, the
Court maintained, hinders the "reallocation of economic resources to
their highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and
competition."59 This unqualified praise of tender offers could apply
transactions."). The perils of using an interstate commerce analysis for intracorporate regulation are
discussed infra at Part IIIB.
55. See, eg., Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F.
Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md.
1982); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982); Sharon Steel v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919
(N.H. 1983).
56. 457 U.S. at 642.
57. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
58. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
59. Id. On this point the Court cited articles by Professors Easterbrook (now a judge on the
Seventh Circuit) and Fischel, two of the leading proponents of applying economic principles to legal
analysis and in particular, advocating a passive role by target managers in responding to a tender
offer.
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equally to other state corporation laws that similarly reduce "the incen-
tive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to per-
form well."'
In addition, the MITE opinion discounted, in language broad enough
to apply to many other state statutes, both of the local interests Illinois
asserted to support its statute. The Court stated that "[w]hile protecting
local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no le-
gitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders. Insofar as the
Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be
weighed in the balance to sustain the law."61 Citing this statement, other
courts have held that the states have no interest in protecting nonresident
shareholders, even shareholders of a local corporation.62 Under this
view, if Delaware's corporation statute were subject to a commerce
clause balancing test, Delaware would have little or no interest in pro-
tecting out-of-state shareholders of Delaware corporations.
Finally, the Court gave little weight to the internal affairs doctrine as a
justification for state regulation of tender offers. The Court defined the
internal affairs doctrine as "a conflict of laws principle which recognizes
that only one state should have the authority to regulate a corporation's
internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationship among or between
the corporation and its current officers, directors and shareholders-be-
cause otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting de-
mands."63 Tender offers, according to the Court, contemplate only a
transfer of stock and "do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of
the target company." 64
A subsequent lower court decision extended this reasoning to conclude
that "[r]egulation of shareholders-and those who would become share-
holders-is not the same as regulating the corporation itself."' 65 This rul-
ing overlooks the fact that one of the traditional functions of state
60. Id.
61. Id. at 644.
62. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261 (7th Cir.), prob.
juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) (Indiana has no interest in protecting residents of Connecticut
from being stampeded); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 763-64 (S.D. Ohio),
aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986); APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp.
1216, 1222 (D. Minn. 1985).
63. 457 U.S. at 645.
64. Id.
65. APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1223-34 (D. Minn.
1985); see also Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 763 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796
F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) ("so fundamental that it cannot be disregarded").
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corporation law has been to regulate the rights of shareholders against
management within that corporation.66 Indeed, almost all courts follow-
ing Edgar v. MITE fail to acknowledge that federal law regulates tender
offers in part because of their effect on the shareholder-management rela-
tionship, but in a way that complements, without supplanting, the ex-
isting state substantive regulation of that relationship. Similarly, a
number of courts discussing the preemption issue have opined that the
Williams Act reflects a choice of a market approach over a fiduciary ap-
proach67 without recognizing the intended interaction of the Williams
Act with the long-standing state and common law fiduciary duties used
for regulating shareholder-management relations. In these contexts, the
courts' broad statements of the federal legislative purposes and narrow
recognition of state interests have the effect of federalizing a large portion
of state corporation law.
In one sense, the conclusions in this section are overstated. Most of
the judicial statements cited here occurred in decisions interpreting "first
generation" statutes like the Illinois statute in MITE. Those statutes do
not involve the more difficult questions as to the division of federal and
state responsibility. In those statutes, the states sought to regulate mar-
ket transactions between bidders and target shareholders, the very trans-
actions that Congress regulated in the Williams Act.6 1 Moreover, "first
generation" statutes regulated an area that lacked both a history of state
regulation and any indication of congressional intent to preserve the area
for state regulation. In addition, the broad extraterritorial reach of these
statutes and the possibility of many states regulating the same transac-
66. The APL court distinguished "regulation of shareholders and those who would become
shareholders" from regulating the corporation itself, suggesting that the latter is left to state law.
622 F. Supp. at 1223. If the court meant that shareholder transactions across markets can be distin-
guished from intrafirm relationship, the statement makes more sense. The court must still come to
grips, however, with the bifurcated effect of tender offers as both market and firm transactions.
67. See, ag., Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 1982); Na-
tional City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir. 1982); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 758-59
(S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986). In the early cases cited above the immediate focus
of the courts were provisions giving state officials control over a tender offer. But the courts also
rejected a state argument that their laws were designed to give directors an opportunity to respond
on behalf of their shareholders.
68. Not only were the states regulating the transactions regulated in the Williams Act, they
often also used mechanisms that Congress had rejected. See, e.g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 634-36 (dis-
cussing the precommencement notification provisions of the Illinois statute).
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tions raised substantial commerce clause objections.69 But these judicial
notions, suggesting a broad purpose for the Williams Act and a broad
reach for the commerce clause, gained a powerful momentum in these
early cases that now has begun to affect decisions in which a more direct
conflict arises between the Williams Act and traditional state regulation
of corporations.
B. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. and Other Cases Ruling on
Private Defensive Tactics
In contrast to the MITE line of cases another body of case law recog-
nizes that Congress superimposed the Williams Act over the existing
state regulation of corporations in a way that left substantial room for
state statutes regulating shareholder-management relations, even when
state-authorized corporate structures might affect the ability of a share-
holder to respond to a tender offer. Many of these cases acknowledge the
influence of Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,7" the Supreme Court's
leading decision on the relationship of federal securities law to state cor-
poration law.
In this line of cases litigation frequently originated in a challenge to
defensive tactics implemented by target management to ward off an un-
wanted tender offer. The plaintiff, often a competing bidder, argued that
the target's acts constituted manipulative acts prohibited by section 14(e)
of the 1934 Act.71 In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.72 the Sixth Circuit
held that target management's sale of its "crown jewel" asset 73 to one of
two bidders competing for the target's shares artificially capped the mar-
ket price and therefore violated section 14(e).74
69. Id. at 642, 645.
70. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Section 14(e) is a broad antifraud provision that makes it "un-
lawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices
. in connection with any tender offer." Id.
72. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
73. "Crown jewels" refer to a company's most valuable asset. The board of directors of a target
company, facing a tender offer from an unwanted bidder, may agree to sell the crown jewels to
another party to decrease the attractiveness of the target to the initial bidder. In Mobil, the target,
Marathon, sought to deflect an unwelcome bid from Mobil by agreeing to sell its Yates Oil Field to a
second bidder, U.S. Steel. Marathon also granted stock options to U.S. Steel.
74. 669 F.2d at 376 ("Mobil has shown a sufficient likelihood of ultimately establishing that the
Yates Field option and the stock option had the effect of creating an artificial price ceiling in the
tender offer market for Marathon common shares, and that the options therefore are 'manipulative
acts or practices' in connection with a tender offer in violation of Section 14(e) of the Williams
Act.")
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Three other circuit courts of appeal75 and the United States Supreme
Court in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,76 roundly rejected the
Sixth Circuit's approach. The narrow holding of these cases is that "ma-
nipulation" requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure, a holding con-
sistent with earlier Supreme Court definitions of that term as used in rule
10b-5. 77 The more interesting aspect of these cases for current discussion
is their view of the Williams Act and the relative role of state and federal
law which provided the basis for the courts' narrow definition of
manipulation.
These cases emphasize that the primary focus of federal regulation in
the Williams Act is disclosure. They reject the plaintiffs' efforts to bring
under the Williams Act actions in which shareholders essentially claim
management breached its fiduciary duty. In Schreiber, for example, a
bidder cancelled a tender offer under circumstances suggesting that the
target management might have benefited at the expense of its sharehold-
ers.78 In other cases, as in Mobil, the target board granted an option to
one of two bidders or otherwise locked up the target's assets.79 The
Eighth Circuit said simply that when a plaintiff claims a "breach of fidu-
ciary duty without more, the plaintiff's remedy lies under state law.")80
75. See Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984); Schreiber v. Burlington
N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v.
Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v.
Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
76. 472 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1985).
77. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
78. Burlington Northern initially made a hostile tender offer for 25.1 million shares (51%) of El
Paso Gas Co. at $24 per share. El Paso management opposed the takeover, but its shareholders fully
subscribed the offer. El Paso management then negotiated a friendly takeover with Burlington. Bur-
lington rescinded its first offer without buying any shares and replaced it with a new offer for only 21
million shares from the public shareholders at the same $24 price. For those shares not purchased in
the tender offer, Burlington eventually paid $12 cash and one-quarter share of Burlington preferred
stock. The parties disagreed about whether that consideration equalled the amount paid in the
tender offer. 105 S. Ct. at 2460 n.1. As a part of the second tender offer, Burlington agreed to
recognize "golden parachute" contracts between El Paso and four of its senior officers, allegedly
worth millions of dollars. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197 (D. Del. 1983), aff'd,
731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
79. See, eg., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984). To fight off an unwanted tender offer by Data Probe, Datatab granted
another bidder, CRC, a one year irrevocable option to purchase 1,407,674 authorized but unissued
Datatab shares at $1.40 per share. Because Datatab had only 703,836 shares of common stock
outstanding, the option, in practical effect, guaranteed that CRC could acquire Datatab no matter
how many of the outstanding shares were tendered to Data Probe.
80. Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741 F.2d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1984).
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In a pre-Mobil case, the Seventh Circuit held:
Here there is uncontroverted evidence that it was Field's recent acquisition
and plans for expansion that caused the withdrawal of the CHH tender
offer. The decision to make acquisitions is one governed by the state law of
directors' fiduciary duty. Therefore even if such conduct were a breach of
the defendant directors' fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs would be relegated to
their remedy at state law. This argument therefore cannot create a federal
securities law claim where the alleged "wrong" the defendant committed is
barred from federal scrutiny by the rule of Santa Fe.81
The Third Circuit decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in Schreiber
expressly declined to follow Mobil because of the Supreme Court's reluc-
tance, as expressed in Santa Fe, to federalize state corporation law.82
A 1983 district court decision, Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v.
Datatab, Inc.,83 tried to reconcile MITE and Santa Fe. In ruling on
whether a target board's defensive tactic violates section 14(e), Judge
Sofaer wrote that Congress imposed two duties on tender offer
participants:
First, to provide shareholders the required information; and second, to re-
frain from any conduct that unduly impedes the shareholders' exercise of
the decisionmaking prerogative guaranteed to them by Congress.... Con-
gress indeed meant for the federal courts to prevent tender offer partici-
pants from interfering with the informed investor choice that the Act
sought to assure.8 4
Indeed, Judge Sofaer argued that Edgar v. MITE, "written by the Justice
who authored Santa Fe, is strong evidence that the Court will recognize
that the Williams Act has federally enforceable objectives beyond mere
disclosure."85 Yet, the district court's effort to reconcile MITE and
Santa Fe did not survive appeal. The Second Circuit found the gravamen
of the claim to be a breach of fiduciary duty that if entertained "would
unquestionably embark us on a course leading to a federal common law
of fiduciary obligations."' 86 The court argued that under existing federal
legislation it was not free to condemn a breach of fiduciary duty.
This division of regulatory responsibility between the federal law's em-
81. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981) (citations omitted).
82. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
83. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722
F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
84. Id. at 1545.
85. Id. at 1555.
86. 722 F.2d at 4.
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phasis on disclosure and state law's regulation of fiduciary duty tracks
closely the accommodation of state and federal regulation worked out in
cases applying rule lOb-5 to allegations of corporate mismanagement . 7
In cases alleging that directors have breached their fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by causing the corporation to engage in a securities transac-
tion favorable to the directors personally but unfavorable to the corpora-
tion, courts have had to confront the intersection of federal regulation of
the purchase-and-sale transaction and state law regulation of the intra-
corporate relationship between shareholders and directors. In Santa Fe,
the Supreme Court ruled that absent express authorization from Con-
gress, the Court would not interpret rule lOb-5 to federalize the large
body of corporation law involving transactions in securities.8"
Several of the Schreiber cases cite Santa Fe, in effect holding that the
Williams Act does not federalize all corporate law that affects tender of-
fers. These cases leave for state law the question of whether a board can
take particular defensive action, even though the action deprives share-
holders of the opportunity to accept a tender offer. This deference
should influence judicial interpretations of "second generation" takeover
statutes framed in the form of traditional regulation of internal corporate
affairs.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF MITE AND SCHREIBER/SANTA FE: THE
SECOND GENERATION STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE DEFENSIVE TACTICS
A. The Overlap of Second Generation Statutes and Private Defensive
Tactics
Neither the MITE nor the Schreiber lines of cases discuss in any detail
the conflicting approach of the other cases. Either the issue was not
raised, or the court summarily disposed of the issue with conclusory
statements that the constitutional prohibitions of the supremacy clause
and the commerce clause apply only to state, not private actors.8 9
The incompleteness of the analysis in these cases has become more
obvious as state legislatures have changed their method of regulating
takeovers. Instead of free-standing statutes labeled as regulation of se-
curities transactions, states are now fitting their takeover legislation
87. See infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
88. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41 & 151-55.
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within their corporations codes and emphasizing the similarity of this
new legislation to traditional state regulation of corporate internal affairs.
In effect, these new statutes change the substantive relationship between
shareholders and managers, usually making managers less vulnerable to
challenges from their shareholders. Challenges to these new statutes,
therefore, may also apply to the many other provisions of state corpora-
tion codes which also regulate the shareholder-management relationship.
Furthermore, as takeover statutes have become more enmeshed with
state regulation of intrafirm relationships, it has become more difficult to
distinguish the hindrance these takeover statutes pose to interstate com-
merce and to the broadly interpreted purposes of the Williams Act from
similar hindrances erected by directors of target corporations pursuant to
existing authorization in the corporation codes. Indeed, to some extent
statutes have copied defensive tactics pioneered by target firms.90 These
statutes thus provide a type of standardized contract for firms incorpo-
rated in those states.9
To explore further the interrelationship of the two lines of cases con-
sider the following methods by which states have sought to protect target
managers from unwanted takeover bids:
1. Revised First Generation Statutes. Several states revised their first
generation statutes after MITE, removing the extraterritoriality and the
hearing or precommencement notice provisions found objectionable by
the Supreme Court.92 These statutes continue to require bidders to make
certain disclosures to target shareholders and often provide for enforce-
ment of violations beyond the enforcement provided by the Williams
90. The supermajority fair price statutes described infra notes 104 and accompanying text, for
example, parallel private defensive tactics, such as the poison pill. See infra note 110. Cf 19 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 345 (1987) (noting Ohio's effort in early 1987 to validate "poison pill" in the
wake of the attempted takeover of Goodyear).
91. A supermajority statute, for example, saves a corporation not only the costs of drafting, but
also the costs of getting such a provision approved by the shareholders. Under state law such
changes usually require a charter amendment which requires a shareholder meeting and vote. Such
a statute also permits management to avoid a negative shareholder vote. In some situations it may
be easier for a target corporation to persuade the state legislature than their own shareholders. See,
Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987). If this is a com-
mon explanation of state legislation, it may spur the demand for federal corporation law, but it seems
difficult to separate a state preferring management in a takeover statute from other apparent mana-
gerial preferences found in corporation law generally.
92. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-1 (1985); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1501 et seq. (Supp.
1986); IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1 (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500-409.566
(Vernon Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STATS. 78.376 (1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1600 (McKinney
1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 451-62 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-5-101
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Act.93 As limited, provisions of this sort in the Minnesota and Massa-
chusetts statutes have been upheld by federal courts.94
2. Control Share Acquisition Statutes. Statutes in some states condi-
tion the right to own or vote shares obtained in a tender offer on a major-
ity vote of all shareholders. 95 These statutes extend the analogy made by
the Williams Act in seeking to subject all kinds of corporate changes of
control to parallel federal regulation.96 The control share acquisition
statutes seek to subject the different kinds of changes of control to paral-
lel state regulation. Just as mergers traditionally have required the ap-
proval of shareholders, these statutes would condition change of control
through a tender offer on a vote of the shareholders. Five of these stat-
utes have been held unconstitutional by federal courts,9 7 perhaps because
they regulate the intrafirm relationship by directly regulating the market
transaction.
3. Reduced Vote Statutes. As a variation of the control share acquisi-
(1984 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-5-1 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-528 (1985); Wis.
STAT. § 552.01 (West Supp. 1985).
See also Cane & Taussig, Hawaii's 1985 Corporate Takeover Legislation: Is It Constitutional?, 8
HAWAII L. REV. 391 (1986) (discussing Hawaii's revised first generation statute).
93. The Indiana, New York, Virginia and Wisconsin statutes, cited supra note 92, apply only to
corporations chartered under that state's laws (and sometimes include an additional requirement
that the corporation have assets within the state or some other connection with the state). The other
states, however, continue the pattern of the first generation statutes. These statutes apply to target
companies based on criteria that potentially overlap with other states. Because they do not purport
to regulate the shareholder-management relationship, this second group of states thus raises issues
distinct from the others discussed in this Article.
94. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding several
provisions of the Minnesota Corporate Takeover Act (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01 (West 1986)); ef
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (upholding against a preemp-
tion challenge MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 1 10c (Mitchie/Law. Co-op 1985), which provides state reme-
dies for failure to comply with the Williams Act disclosure requirements or parallel state disclosure
obligations). TheAgency decision predates MITE, but both decisions have influenced other states to
adopt similar approaches.
95. See, eg., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 416-171 & 172 (1985); IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 (Burns
Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.01 1, 302A.449, 302A.671 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 351.015, 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1987); OHIo REV. CODE § 1701.831 (Page 1985).
96. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the desire to make tender offer regula-
tion similar to federal regulation of proxy fights and share-for-share exchanges).
97. See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (Ohio statute);
Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 268
(1986) (Indiana statute); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986) (Hawaii statute);
APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, (D. Minn. 1985) (Minnesota
statute); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri statute amended to apply to
non-Missouri chartered companies with significant impact on Missouri, in this case, Trans World
Airlines).
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tion statute, one state limits the voting power of a shareholder who owns
more than twenty percent of a corporation's voting stock to ten percent
of the full voting power of those shares, unless the holders of a majority
of shares vote to restore full voting power at a meeting called for that
purpose.
98
4. Appraisal Statutes. These statutes give individual shareholders a
right to have their shares redeemed by the corporation under specified
circumstances, such as the acquisition by another shareholder of a major-
ity (or some smaller portion) of the target company's stock.9 9 Almost all
state corporation statutes provide appraisal rights to minority sharehold-
ers who dissent from fundamental corporate changes such as mergers."
These takeover statutes extend that right to shareholders in a tender of-
fer. They often copy the state's general appraisal procedure although
some define the "fair value" to be paid for the shares differently (and
more favorably to shareholders). 10 1
5. Second-Step/Five-Year Delay Statutes. Statutes in some states for-
bid second step mergers and other similar transactions for five years fol-
lowing any tender offer that does not receive the prior approval of the
target company's board of directors. New York passed such legislation
in late 1985,102 and several other states have since followed its lead.1" 3
These statutes emphasize the role of directors in tender offers and impose
a potentially severe penalty for bidders who prefer to avoid the board and
take their offer directly to shareholders.
6. Second-Step/Supermajority-Fair Price Statutes. Several states now
condition second step mergers or other similar transactions on a
supermajority vote or on payment to the remaining shareholders of a
98. Wis. STAT. § 180.25 (West Supp. 1986). Statutes cited in note 95 as control share statutes
sometimes are phrased in terms of voting restriction. Indiana's statutes states that shares acquired in
a control share acquisition have only such voting rights as approved by shareholders. Minnesota
and Hawaii limit voting rights for one year if shares are acquired in violation of the statute. All
three states provide for redemption by the corporation for share acquisitions that do not comply
with the statute.
99. ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §§ 603. 716 & 910 (Supp. 1986); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986). Cf HAW. REV. STAT. § 417-19 (1985).
100. See generally F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 5 (2d ed. 1985).
101. Most states' appraisal statutes provide the minority shareholder with an award based on
value that excludes any increase or decrease from the fundamental corporate change. See id. Take-
over appraisal statutes define value to include the value brought about by the tender offer.
102. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986).
103. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.391 (Baldwin 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43 (Bums
Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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statutorily defined fair price." Pioneered by Maryland, these statutes
appear less restrictive than the New York statute because they impose no
absolute time bar. But these statutes define fair price in a way so
favorable to remaining shareholders that the second step merger is ex-
tremely expensive.' 05 These statutes also encourage bidders to negotiate
with the target board of directors because the pre-existing board usually
can waive the onerous provision.' 0 6
7. Fiduciary Duty Statutes. These statutes codify a broader definition
of the director fiduciary duty than the previous state common-law defini-
tion of that duty. 107 A statute of this type might, for example, authorize
directors of a target company responding to a tender offer to consider a
variety of interests beyond those of shareholders. 108
8. "Delaware Approach" Traditional corporation statutes in states
without specific takeover laws contain provisions that grant boards of
directors broad, permissive powers to manage the corporation. 09 The
similarity of this approach to those previously mentioned becomes more
104. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601 (1985 & Supp. 1986); see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 33-374(a) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-231 (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 7.85
(Smith-Hurd 1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:132 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(775) (Callaghan Supp. 1986); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1002-06, 1408-1505, 1908-10 (Purdon Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.725 (West Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725-728 (1985). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1987).
105. See, eg., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-202(b) (1985). Maryland defines the fair
market value of common stock to at least equal the highest value determined under three alterna-
tives: 1) highest per share price paid by the bidder within the previous two years or in the transac-
tion in which the bidder became the owner of more than 10 percent of the target; 2) the market value
on the date the second step is announced or when the bidder became a 10 percent shareholder; 3) a
price equal to market value in (2) multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the highest per
share price paid by the bidder in the preceding two years and the denominator of which is the
market value when the bidder first began to acquire stock within the previous two years. See Hanks,
Maryland-Type Takeover Statutes: Are they "Fair Price" or Foul Ball?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at
32, 34 (discussing how the statute will in many cases produce a price substantially higher than any
price paid by the bidder to any stockholder at any time during the tender offer or subsequently).
Some states vary the definition. Michigan for example does not include the third step "multiplier"
part of the definition.
106. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(c) (1985).
107. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408.B3 (Purdon Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.59 (Page 1985).
See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.30 (1984) for an example of the traditional common law duty of
directors which has been codified in many states.
108. See, eg., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1987); OHIo REV. CODE § 1701.59 D
(Page Supp. 1987); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408.B3 (Purdon Supp. 1986). See also ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.85 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
109. See infra note 155.
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obvious in states such as Delaware, where state courts have interpreted
the traditional corporate law broadly to authorize boards of directors to
take steps similar to the defensive tactics other states have implemented
by statute.' 10
Even this list does not exhaust the various approaches. Some states
have enacted specialized statutes applicable to specific industries or as
part of other regulatory schemes. 1 I I Given the tenacity demonstrated by
the state legislatures in the past decade" 2 there is little reason to believe
that we have seen the last of innovative state statutes. But this list pro-
vides enough of a glimpse of the potential for state regulation to facilitate
a discussion of the appropriate role of state and federal law.
B. The MITE Theories as Broadly Applied
Both the preemption and the commerce clause theories of MITE have
been used not only to challenge "first generation" state regulation of
tender offers, but also to challenge a much broader realm of state legisla-
tion, including that just described.
L Preemption and the Broad Purpose of the Williams Act
A recurring argument made in cases challenging state takeover laws is
that the Williams Act mandates a market for corporate control unfet-
tered by state law. The legislative history of the Act contains several
references to providing the investors with information so that they can
110. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (approving a director-
implemented poison pill that would provide shareholders with a return similar to the Appraisal
Statutes or the Second Step/Supermajority/Fair Price statutes); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe-
troleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (upholding discriminatory buyback of shares by target).
Other states may not follow Delaware in the leeway given to directors. See, eg., Minstar Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
111. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 § 601 (West Supp. 1987) (Special statutes regarding
energy companies declared unconstitutional in Mesa Partners II v. Unocal Corp., 607 F. Supp. 624
(W.D. Okla. 1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 343D-1 (1985) (statute regulating environmental matters).
Many states have special statutes purporting to regulate takeovers in industries such as insurance.
See, eg., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd on other
grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (invalidating provisions of Missouri Insurance Holding Com-
panies Act). An unusual provision of New York's takeover statute prohibits "greenmail." N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 513 (McKinney 1986).
112. Many states have passed multiple takeover laws as an existing state law is declared uncon-
stitutional or as new methods appear to offer improved means of achieving state goals. Missouri has
passed five different types of statutes and Oklahoma four. Wisconsin recently repealed its control
share acquisition statute and passed a new statute limiting the voting power of a hostile bidder. See
Wis. ANN. STAT. ANN. § 180.25 (West Supp. 1986).
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make their own choice.113 Both courts and commentators have viewed
these references as expressing the purpose of protecting the shareholders'
right freely to decide whether to sell their shares into a market influenced
by tender offerors.' 14  Management defensive tactics that remove the
tender offer decision from the shareholder arguably frustrate these pur-
poses. 1 5 It is only a short step to conclude that the Williams Act, there-
fore, limits defensive tactics which operate to preclude shareholder
consideration of tender offers.1
16
A corollary frequently drawn is that Congress intended the sharehold-
ers to be the actual decision-makers and not some other group-whether
a state commissioner, the target board of directors or even the sharehold-
ers collectively rather than individually. I 7 Judge Wisdom sounded a va-
riation of this theme in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell I 8 where he argued that Congress chose a "mar-
ket approach" over what he labeled the "fiduciary approach" of the
Idaho law, which sought to give the target board of directors an opportu-
nity to respond to a takeover. 119
113. See, eg., SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3; Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 15 (state-
ment of SEC Chairman Cohen) & 146 (statement of Senator Williams); Takeover Bids, Hearings on
S. 510 Before Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968) (statement of Chairman Cohen) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
114. See, eg., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd,
796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986); Ihcan v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, (W.D. Mo. 1985).
115. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 n.9 (1982) (quoting 113 CoNG. REC.
24666 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits), for the point that Congress did not want to deny share-
holders "the opportunities which result from competitive bidding for a block of stock of a target
company"). Accord APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.
Minn. 1985).
116. See Note, Federal Limitations on Target Defensive Tactics: Applying Edgar v. MITE Corp.
to the "Private Conduct" of Target Directors, infra at p..
117. See, eg., Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 1982); Na-
tional City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir. 1982); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 758-59
(S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986). Some commentators suggest such a policy may be
short-sighted, at least in some situations. See Baysinger & Butler, AntitakeoverAmendments, Mana-
gerial Entrenchment and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REv. 1257 (1985);
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1693 (1985); Osterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender
Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORN. L. REv. 53 (1986).
118. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
119. Id. at 1279.
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These broad views of the Williams Act can be used to attack several of
the state statutes described above. The control share acquisition statutes
effectively put the decision about a tender offer into the hands of the
shareholders as a group. For this reason several courts have struck down
these statutes.12 0 The second-step/five-year delay statutes, such as the
New York statute, place the tender offer decision in the hands of the
directors, unless the bidder is willing to wait five years to complete a
second-step merger. The Maryland second-step/supermajority-fair price
statute puts the decision in the hands of the directors, unless the bidder is
willing to seek supermajority shareholder approval or pay the statutory
fair price. These second-step statutes more indirectly provide the direc-
tors with decision-making power but they nevertheless raise the costs of a
tender offer, thereby reducing the number of tender offers and limiting
the extent to which shareholders will have the opportunity to sell their
shares into a market influenced by potential tender offerors. 121
The fiduciary duty statutes also can be attacked on the ground that
they take the decision out of the shareholders' hands.122 Even the ap-
praisal statutes are vulnerable to similar arguments. If a nonmajority
group seeks appraisal and raises the bidder's takeover cost, thus possibly
deterring the offer, the statute can be read as putting the decision in the
hands of this small group contrary to the shareholder-decision approach
of the Williams Act.' 23 Similarly, one court found that the Williams Act
preempts state law to the extent that it permits boards of directors to
grant options to purchase authorized but unissued stock without share-
holder approval, if the option is used to abort an ongoing tender offer. 124
120. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris.
noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio),
aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
121. See Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Tack, 83
MICH. L. REV. 433, 462-69 (1984); Hanks, Maryland Type Statutes: Are They Fair Price or Foul
Ball, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 32, 38 (because the fair price provisions "effectively prevent the
consummation of the freeze-out transaction in the second step, they inevitably discourage bidders
from initiating a first step").
122. Junewicz, The Supremacy Clause and the Second Generation State Takeover Statutes, in
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, NEW DIRECTIONS IN STATE TAKEOVER REGULATION, THE SEC-
OND GENERATION STATUTES, 129, 162 (1986). Cf Sell, A Critical Analysis of a New Approach to
State Takeover Legislation After MITE, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 473, 486-87 (1984).
123. Cf Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 1982).
124. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1555 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984) (referring to §§ 501 and 505 of New
York's Business Corporation Act); see also Johnson, Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute
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2. Interstate Commerce
The heightened concern with state regulation of interstate commerce
illustrated in the MITE line of cases also has potentially broad implica-
tions for state takeover legislation and state corporation laws generally.
Many of the cases, including MITE itself, seem to equate interference
with the market for corporate control to interference with interstate com-
merce.125 Ruling on an Indiana law, Judge Posner wrote that "the effi-
ciency with which [a corporation's tangible assets] are employed and the
proportions in which the earnings they generate are divided between
management and shareholders depends on the market for corporate con-
trol-an interstate, indeed international, market that the state of Indiana
is not authorized to opt out of, as in effect it has done in this statute."' 126
If interference with the market for corporate control indeed constitutes
interference with interstate commerce, a variety of laws and defensive
tactics can be subjected to interstate commerce challenge. Utilizing this
approach, several courts have held that the control share acquisition stat-
utes impair the ability of the bidder to do business with the target share-
holders and thus burden interstate commerce.' 27 The New York and
other second-step statutes also interfere with the bidder-shareholder rela-
tionship, even if somewhat more indirectly. 128 Another court has invali-
dated state blue sky laws to the extent that they interfere with the timing
of an interstate tender offer and, thus, decrease its chances of success. 129
But this theory has even broader implications:
-Any state corporate statute (e.g., permitting cumulative voting, stag-
gered terms for directors, no removal of directors without cause prior to
and the Need for New Judicial Analysis of State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
183 (1986).
125. See APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, (D. Minn. 1985);
Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
126. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107
S. Ct. 258 (1986).
127. See id. at 261; Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986) (Hawaii statute);
Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.
1986) (Ohio statute); APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp, 1216, (D.
Minn. 1985) (Minnesota statute); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri
statute as applied to foreign corporations).
128. See Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Tack, 83
MICH. L. REv. 433 (1984); but see Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price
Legislation, 43 MD. L. REV. 266 (1984).
129. Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); but see Dynamics
Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263-64 (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258
(1986); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1415 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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the end of a term, authorizing issuance of "poison pill" stock) that makes
it more difficult to make a tender offer similarly interferes with the mar-
ket for corporate control. 130
-State common law could be challenged on similar grounds. For ex-
ample, judicial adoption of an "equal opportunity rule" entitling all
shareholders to share in a control premium might run afoul of the
prohibitions in the commerce clause. 131
-Even such apparently unrelated laws such as those requiring bonds
to appeal a judgment are vulnerable to this challenge. Texaco argued in
its case against Getty Oil that the Texas bond requirements impermissi-
bly interfered with the market for corporate control and were therefore
invalid. 132 The court did not rule on that issue, but such a holding could
flow logically from previous holdings.
This broad connection of interference with the market for corporate
control and interference with interstate commerce addresses only the
"burdens" side of the balancing equation used for indirect interferences
with interstate commerce. 33 The MITE line of cases suggests that this
burden will occur in many of the examples cited above and that it will be
"substantial."1 4
On the benefits side of the equation, MITE and subsequent courts
ascribe very little weight to state regulation of corporations chartered
under its law. MITE characterized the internal affairs doctrine as a con-
flict of laws principle "of little use to the State in this context." '35 Other
courts have found the doctrine of little use to the state in other con-
texts. 136 Thus, Delaware, with many national corporations and few resi-
dent shareholders, will have to persuade the court that the benefits to its
130. See Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563, 625
(1983); ef Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261 (7th Cir.), prob. juris, noted,
107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) (distinguishing cumulative voting from control share acquisition statute where
the effect on the interstate market is direct, intended and substantial; it is not merely the incidental
effect of a general regulation of internal corporate governance). See also Skadden Arp's Poison Pill
Stance Raises Conflict of Interest Concern, Wall St. J., July 23, 1986, at 23, col. 4) (describing a
challenge to such a statute).
131. See Levmore, supra note 130 at 625; see also Fiflis, supra note 25, at 304 n.1.
132. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 251 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d
Cir.), prob. juris notes, 106 S. Ct. 3270 (1986).
133. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text. If the court finds the state regulation to be a
direct restraint on interstate commerce, no balancing would be necessary. See supra notes 53-56 and
accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
135. 457 U.S. at 645.
136. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 763-64 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd,
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state treasury and to its local citizenry from being a center of incorpora-
tions outweigh the burden it imposes on interstate commerce.
States might more successfully convince courts that benefits to resident
shareholders outweigh these costs, at least when a state limits its take-
over law to the application of locally incorporated enterprises with a
great majority of shareholders who are in-state residents. Two courts
have upheld such laws against commerce challenges.' 37 On the other
hand, simply limiting the reach of the law to local residents did not sat-
isfy the Sixth Circuit. Finding the shares held by Michigan shareholders
instrumental to obtaining a majority in a nationwide tender offer, the
court held that a state procedure excluding the offer to Michigan resi-
dents would interfere with the national tender offer and thereby burden
interstate commerce.' 38
Thus, as a result of both the preemption and the commerce clause
analyses a substantial federalization of the law of shareholder-manage-
ment relations may occur. This matter was never expressly debated by
Congress in passing the Williams Act, even though federalization of state
law has been vigorously debated in a variety of other areas.
III. RECONCILING MITE AND SCHREIBER: PRINCIPLES THAT
DEFINE THE APPROPRIATE REALMS OF STATE AND
FEDERAL REGULATION
The broad interpretations of MITE detailed in the previous section
and their potential impact on the federalization of state corporation law
suggest a need for a clearer understanding of the principles that define
the appropriate realms of state and federal regulation over tender offers.
This section examines several policies that could provide a basis for rec-
onciling MITE with the policies of Santa Fe as set forth in the Schreiber
line of cases and thereby define those roles.
A. Distinguishing State from Private Conduct
There is little direct conflict between the MITE and Schreiber lines of
cases if activities in the Schreiber cases can be characterized as private
actions to which the constitutional prohibitions of the supremacy clause
796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986); APL Limited Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216,
1223 (D. Minn. 1985).
137. See L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, (6th Cir. 1985); Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc.
v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984). Both of these cases involved revised first generation statutes.
138. Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 1982).
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and the commerce clause do not apply. 139 The first courts to address the
issue of whether MITE's constitutional principles apply to defensive tac-
tics in a tender offer fight have in fact used this argument. The Delaware
Supreme Court in Moran v. Household International, Inc.,'4 a decision
upholding a poison pill defense under Delaware law, ruled that statutory
authorization of private conduct provides an insufficient nexus to the
state to constitute "state action."'1 41
That holding seems inconsistent with other cases in which preempted
state law has not been so narrowly defined. In San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, the United States Supreme Court held that
state common law could not be applied in a way that frustrates federal
labor policy.' 4 2 Similar holdings exist for other laws. 143
There is also precedent for a broader preemption when the federal se-
curities laws and state corporate regulation overlap. In a recent Sixth
Circuit case, In re General Tire and Rubber Co. Securities Litigation, "
shareholders challenged the dismissal of a derivative suit by the corpora-
tion's directors acting pursuant to their authority under state law to man-
age the corporation. Under Ohio common law, it seemed likely that the
business judgment rule would protect the board's decision from judicial
review.' 45 Plaintiffs claimed this application of state common law would
139. The application of the constitutional language to state rather than private actions has been
most widely noted in connection with the fourteenth amendment. See, eg., Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313, 318 (1879). But similar limitations have been applied to the supremacy and interstate
commerce clauses. See infra notes 140-41 & 151-55 and accompanying text.
140. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
141. Id. at 1353.
142. 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (tort action for damages resulting from unfair labor practices-picket-
ing and boycotting non-union employee-preempted by §§ 7-8 of the National Labor Relations
Act).
143. See, e.g., Arkansas-La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) (Natural Gas Act blocked
method by which state court calculated damages in a breach of contract action); Chicago & N.W.
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) (Interstate Commerce Act precluded
common law negligence action based on purported interference with contractual relations with cus-
tomers brought by rail line against regulated rail carrier who sought and obtained ICC approval to
abandon railroad line). Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (punitive damages
permitted for state common law action against operator of nuclear power plant despite claim of
preemption by federal nuclear power regulation; common law action can be preempted but federal
policy in this case found not to extend so far as to require preemption of this action).
144. 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984).
145. Id. at 1081-82. The business judgment rule is a judicial principle under which judges defer
to the decision of the board of directors who are authorized by state law to act on behalf of the
corporation unless there is self-dealing or some other disabling attribute that prevents the directors
from acting.
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frustrate federal policy underlying the proxy provisions.
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that it would preempt application of
the Ohio business judgment rule if the rule frustrated the federal proxy
laws. It declined to do so in this case, however, because plaintiffs had
failed to establish a causal connection between their claims and the trans-
action authorized by shareholders through the proxy process. 146 Still, the
court left no doubt that in other situations the business judgement rule
can frustrate federal policy and that in those situations the court would
prevent the application of state law.147 Using similar reasoning, the busi-
ness judgment rule could not be used to protect director defensive tactics
authorized by state law, if those tactics conflict with the Williams Act.
The result in General Tire and Rubber is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Burks v. Lasker.148 Burks also involved a challenge
to a director dismissal of a derivative suit as conflicting with federal law.
The court rejected the claim, not because the directors were "private"
actors, but because federal policy was not broad enough to supplant the
authorization of director action found in state law. In language bearing
on the Williams Act, the Court stated that "in this field congressional
legislation is generally enacted against the background of existing state
law; Congress has never indicated the entire corpus of state corporation
law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based
upon a federal statute." 14 9
The cited cases provide ample precedent for preempting director con-
duct authorized by state law, if federal policy would thereby be frus-
trated. Courts, therefore, should focus on the purpose of the federal law
rather than the state/private distinction. If the purposes of the Williams
Act are interpreted in light of the MITE plurality to maintain neutrality
in the broader sense of that term, 150 the Williams Act would preempt
many director actions.
This focus on congressional purpose provides a second method by
146. Id. at 1081.
147. Id. at 1082.
148. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
149. Id. at 478. See also Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982) (federal policy
does not preclude dismissal of §§ 10(b) and 14(a) claims by a special litigation committee); Lewis v.
Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 1980)
(federal policy precludes summary dismissal of a well-pleaded claim number under § 14(a) pursuant
to the business judgment of defendant directors where the claim goes to the disclosures required by
the federal act).
150. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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which one court has avoided the constitutional issue regarding private
defensive tactics. The Second Circuit in Data Probe suggested that the
Williams Act was more concerned about some state laws (special take-
over statutes) than other state laws (corporation statutes or common law
authorizing director conduct). In Data Probe, the district court had
maintained that "[t]he notion that the reasoning in Edgar v. MITE Corp.
can be distinguished as inapplicable to private suits seems unsound." '
The Second Circuit disagreed and found the Williams Act inapplicable to
the challenged director action. Without discussion, the court also held
the commerce clause inapplicable to a challenge to director conduct.52
It disposed of the supremacy clause objection by interpreting the Wil-
liams Act to bar only "legislative regulation of the tender offer process,
including administrative review of the fairness or unfairness of the of-
fer." '15 3 In a footnote, Judge Winter noted that MITE did not involve
"the application of fiduciary obligations of a contractual nature imposed
by state law," '154 suggesting that this second type of state regulation, the
kind involved in Data Probe, would not be preempted.
Under this view, the MITE and Schreiber lines of cases can be recon-
ciled if the Williams Act reflects a policy choice to override positive state
regulation of tender offers but not state regulation achieved by imposing
fiduciary obligations of a contractual nature or by common law applica-
tions of the business judgment rule enabling directors of target compa-
nies to implement defensive tactics. This focus on the form of state
regulation, however, produces an awkward policy result: interference
with the market for corporate control would be banned if written into a
specific state takeover law but permitted if accomplished by directors
under a more general state law. In effect, this would authorize private
parties to do what the state cannot. State legislatures and judiciaries
would be permitted to foster and encourage defensive tactics that inter-
fere with the market for corporate control. 55 Yet other states would be
151. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1555 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
152. 722 F.2d at 5 ("In Edgar v. MITE Corp ... a majority of the Court held that the Illinois
Takeover Act imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, a rationale inapplicable to
the present dispute which involves private acts.").
153. Id.
154. Id. at 5 n.3.
155. The extent to which the judiciary, legislature, and bar in the relatively small state of Dela-
ware have combined to develop and preserve a favorable legal environment for corporations has been
the topic of substantial writing. See, e.g.. Cary, supra note 1; Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the
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seen as intruding into the realm of the federal regulation or interfering
with interstate commerce when they seek to assist their corporations by
providing a standardized takeover barrier.
Interference with the market for corporate control cannot be so easily
separated. Indeed, the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers
lumped together harm to the economy from defensive tactics provided by
takeover statutes and from actions instituted by private parties acting
pursuant to state law. 156 The elusive nature of such a distinction be-
comes apparent upon considering the various ways state governments
have structured their corporation laws to help directors.
First, it is not self-evident that Delaware's approach to shareholder-
management relations should be treated differently from Ohio's declara-
tion of shareholder-management relations found in its control share ac-
quisitions statute. Delaware's broad grant of authority to directors may
well be a more effective means of aiding managers against shareholders.
As a practical matter, it removes the need for a separate takeover statute
to protect its corporations. 157 Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish the
fiduciary duty, appraisal, and second-step statutes from the Delaware or
Ohio approaches. Each appears to interfere with the market for corpo-
rate control to some extent. Each also appears to reflect a conscious
state policy about the relative positions of shareholders and managers
within a corporation. Thus, these new approaches suggest that division
based on state versus private conduct, or positive state legislation versus
state law imposing fiduciary obligations, will not produce a consistent
theory to differentiate the role for state and federal law in regulating
takeovers.
B. Protectionism and Interstate Commerce Jurisprudence
Questions about the meaning of the commerce clause have occupied a
significant place in the deliberations of the Supreme Court since its earli-
est days, spawning a variety of theories and constant litigation. A recur-
ring theme through much of this history is a basic hostility to
protectionist state legislation that blatantly discriminates against out-of-
Delaware Corporation Law of.1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969). But see Arsht, Reply to Professor
Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1976).
156. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS, Recom-
mendation No. 34 (1983).
157. Delaware had a "first generation" takeover statute, but has taken no legislative action since
Edgar v. MITE to regulate takeovers.
[Vol. 64:1057
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state economic interests."' 8 Certainly judges in the MITE line of cases
have ascribed this type of motive to state statutes that appear designed to
prevent the takeover of local firms.' 59
In a corporate setting courts may be tempted to apply this principle
too readily. The in-state/out-of-state division, which provides a neces-
sary factual foundation for a finding of state protectionism, substantially
overlaps in corporate cases with the management/shareholder division.
Typically, the managers of many large American corporations reside in
the state of incorporation or that state identifies with management, while
the great majority of shareholders reside in other states. Any state law
regulating internal corporate affairs that favors the interests of manage-
ment over those of the shareholders would adversely affect interstate
commerce by transferring the cost of the regulation (including the lost
benefit of an advantageous takeover) to out-of-state shareholders. In this
situation, a court will have a difficult time separating provisions that dis-
criminate against out-of-state interests from many other provisions in the
corporations code.
A court's effort to determine if an entire state corporations code imper-
missibly regulates interstate commerce is eased by the constitutional
principle that Congress may redefine the extent to which states may regu-
late interstate commerce.lw0 In the corporate area, Congress clearly has
left a broad area of shareholder-management relations to state law. 16 1
Using its authority over corporations, a state may prefer managers over
shareholders in a way that unduly harms out-of-state interests. That ten-
dency will, however, be checked to some extent by the competition be-
tween states for corporate charters, 162 which may operate to insure that
states cannot externalize the costs of such changes in the long run.
Against this background, courts should reserve invalidation for com-
merce clause reasons for those cases in which the state statute blatantly
158. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1983);
Mesa Partners II v. Unocal Corp., 607 F. Supp. 624, 629 (D. Okla. 1985).
159. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris noted,
107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
160. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc., 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benja-
min, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). This redefinition need not be stated expressly. See L.P. Acquisition Co. v.
Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 1985) (no "talismanic" significance to expressly stated).
161. See Santa Fe Indus.. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). But see Dynamics Corp. of
America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir.), prob. juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) (no
indication that Williams Act was intended to insulate a state takeover statute from complaints that it
unduly burdens interstate commerce).
162. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
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discriminates against out-of-state interests. When the alleged discrimina-
tion cannot be distinguished easily from shareholder-management con-
flicts, courts should not use the commerce clause to stifle state policy
debates or the debate over federalization of corporation law.163
C. Distinguishing Regulation of the Market for Corporate Control
from Regulation of Capital Markets
Judge Winter, the author of the Second Circuit's Data Probe decision,
previously had suggested an alternative theory that would define the ap-
propriate realms of state and federal regulation of takeovers. In an arti-
cle he wrote while on the Yale Law School faculty, Winter expressed a
general preference for state regulation of corporations. He argued that
the competition between states for charters would facilitate the develop-
ment of legal rules most appropriate for the capital market. 64 A state
corporations code that reduces the yield to shareholders will spawn cor-
porations that are less attractive investment opportunities than compara-
ble corporations chartered in other states or bonds, savings accounts,
land and other investments. 165 Only managers wanting a "one shot take
the money and run raid" would seek out such a code. Winter, however,
exempted regulation of the market for corporate control from this system
of preferred state regulation. He was concerned that competition among
the states would provide inadequate protection for the market for corpo-
rate control. An ineffective market for corporate control would prevent
the effective functioning of product market competition, the competition
for capital, and management's self-interest in seeking to increase its own
return, all of which otherwise operate to "channel the chartering decision
toward those legal arrangements which optimize the management-share-
holder relationship. '166
If state regulation of the market for corporate control is less effective
than state regulation of other aspects of intrafirm relationships, the
proper scope for federal and state law can be defined based on that prin-
ciple. Yet a significant part of Winter's argument turns on the extraterri-
163. "The inherent conflicts between managerial automony... and... investor protection ...
ought to be worked out at the policy level and not diverted into the unpredictable byways of com-
merce clause jurisprudence." Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REv. 813, 845 (1984).
164. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUDiEs 251 (1977).
165. Id. at 257.
166. Id. at 287-88.
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toriality of early takeover laws. This characteristic permitted the statute
to operate outside of the competition between state legal systems for cor-
porate charters. 167 Now that state laws regulating takeovers apply only
to locally incorporated corporations, 168 competition for charters may be
more effective.'
69
Even if there is a need for a federal law to prevail over state law in
regulating the market for corporate control, it is not at all clear that
Congress intended this displacement in passing the Williams Act. The
tender offer is not the only means by which the market for corporate
control operates, although it may be the most effective. 170 Other mecha-
nisms, such as a proxy fight, perform a similar function and federal law
already regulated these mechanisms when Congress enacted the Williams
Act. The legislative history of the Act discloses that Congress sought to
fill the gap in the federal regulatory scheme by covering this newly popu-
lar method of acquiring control. 17' There is no evidence that Congress
intended to regulate the shareholder-director relationship differently
from previous federal regulation.
D. Federal Recognition of State Regulation of Economic Activity
Within the Firm
The theories discussed thus far do not reconcile the federal interven-
167. See id. at 289 ("The extraterritorial features of takeover statutes in effect restrain competi-
tion between state legal systems for corporate charters.").
168. All second generation statutes described supra at notes 95-108 and accompanying text ap-
ply only to corporation's chartered under that particular state's law. Often the statutes also require
some other connection to the state such as a specified portion of assets or shareholders. Some revised
first generation statutes continue to base their coverage on connections other than incorporation
within the state, see supra note 93, and should be distinguished from the remaining statutes for
purposes of this Article.
169. Second generation statutes, such as control share acquisition statutes, still have extraterrito-
rial effect in that they can regulate a transaction between a purchaser and a seller, neither of whom is
a resident of the state in which the corporation is incorporated. However, this type of extraterrito-
rial effect does not let a state externalize the cost of regulation in the same way as the first generation
statutes. If the state's laws favor management and offer an inferior return as compared to corpora-
tions chartered in other states, the state will be adversely affected by the market for competition in
charters.
170. See generally Coffee, supra note 21; see also Winter, supra note 164, at 258 (recognizing that
"one ought not to overstate the case [that competition between the states for charters may provide
inadequate protection in the case of takeover statutes], however, since competition in the product
and capital markets exerts pressure in other directions").
171. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4 ("The bill would correct the current gap in our securi-
ties laws ... to provide for full disclosure"); Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 42 (statement of
Senator Kuchel).
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tion in tender offers permitted in the MITE cases with the respect for
state law found in the Schreiber/Santa Fe cases, nor do they adequately
explain the division of responsibility between federal and state govern-
ment in regulating takeovers. The best explanation for such a division
views state law as providing the primary regulation of the rights among
participants within the corporation and federal law as facilitating the ex-
ercise of these state-provided rights but not creating additional substan-
tive rights. Accordingly, the Williams Act's regulation of the market
transactions between a bidder and a target company shareholder aids
shareholders in monitoring management. But the Act should not be read
to alter existing substantive rights of shareholders against their
managers.
This is not to say that federal law is not concerned with regulating
economic activity within a firm. A variety of provisions in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 are intended to affect the intrafirm relationship.
Proxy rules aim to "prevent management or others from obtaining au-
thorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate dis-
closure." '172 Periodic disclosures required by section 13 of the 1934 Act
similarly aid shareholders in evaluating the performance of their manag-
ers and making decisions concerning the exercise of their rights against
managers.1 73 Antifraud provisions back up the specific disclosure obliga-
tions in accomplishing the desired protection for shareholders.1 74
Both the periodic disclosure and antifraud provisions perform a dual
role. Apart from assisting shareholder monitoring of management per-
formance, both provisions protect investors in the specific transactions in
which they buy and sell securities.' 75 The Williams Act has two simi-
larly interrelated effects, first on the market transaction between the bid-
der and the target shareholder and second on the intrafirm relationship.
Other parts of the federal securities laws specifically regulate changes
in corporate control. All are nonsubstantive in nature and look to state
law for the underlying substantive rights. For example, in friendly acqui-
sitions such as mergers, federal law mandates disclosure if proxies are
solicited from shareholders in order to obtain the necessary approval re-
172. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
174. Id. § 78j(b).
175. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 537 (1983).
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quired by state law. 176 Federal law also requires disclosure if the acquisi-
tion takes the form of a sale of assets, but only if state law requires a
shareholder vote.177 If the particular state permits directors to take ac-
tion without shareholder approval (e.g., short form mergers in most
states), 178 the shareholders will not receive the benefit of the federal dis-
closures. In hostile takeovers which take the form of a proxy fight for the
election of directors, federal law mandates disclosure while state law pro-
vides the election rules. 179 Tender offers continually were compared to
these transactions during consideration of the Williams Act. Insofar as
the new Act was designed to fill a gap in existing regulation and regulate
this new technique in a way parallel to existing regulation,18 ° the federal
role in regulating takeovers, as in these pre-existing areas of federal regu-
lation, should not extend to substantive rights of shareholders vis-a-vis
managers.
Tender offers are not the first area in which a dispute over federal reg-
ulation of intrafirm relationships has arisen. Indeed, this previous debate
should provide guidance in interpreting the Williams Act. In the proxy
regulation area, the most instructive case is SEC v. Transamerica
Corp.,18 a 1947 decision by the Third Circuit ruling on whether a corpo-
ration's proxy solicitation must include shareholder proposals. An SEC
rule required management's proxy statement to include any shareholder
proposal concerning subjects about which state corporation law permit-
ted shareholders to act. Transamerica's management asserted that a by-
law (implemented pursuant to the corporation's charter and the
provisions of Delaware's corporation code) authorized them to act "as a
block or strainer to prevent any proposal to amend the by-laws, which it
may deem unsuitable, from reaching a vote at an annual meeting of
stockholders." '182
The court ruled that the corporation's position was "overnice and un-
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982); rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1986); schedule 14A, Item 14,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100, Item 14 (1986).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982).
178. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905 (McKinney
1986); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.04 (1984).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1986).
180. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3. See also Memorandum of the SEC to the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate on S. 2731, 89th Congress, reprinted in 112 CONG.
REC. 19003, 19005 (1966).
181. 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 847 (1948).
182. Id. at 516.
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tenable," apparently as a matter of Delaware law.18 3 But then, perhaps
as Professor Loss has noted, "because the court realized that it did not
have the last word in interpreting the state law," '184 the court added an
alternative holding:
[A]ssuming arguendo that this was not so, we think that we have demon-
strated that Gilbert's proposals are within the reach of security-holder ac-
tion were it not for the insulation afforded management by the notice
provision of By-law 47. If this minor provision may be employed as Trans-
america seeks to employ it, it will serve to circumvent the intent of Congress
in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It was the intent of Con-
gress to require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage. The
control of great corporations by a very few persons was the abuse at which
Congress struck in enacting Section 14(a). We entertain no doubt that
Proxy Rule X-14A-7 represents a proper exercise of the authority conferred
by Congress on the Commission under Section 14(a). This seems to us to
end the matter. The power conferred upon the Commission by Congress
cannot be frustrated by a corporate by-law.' 85
The court's finding of a congressional intent to require fair opportunity
for corporate suffrage parallels findings by more recent courts requiring
the relatively unfettered operation of the market for corporate control.186
But that may be reading congressional intent too broadly. In the proxy
area, the SEC in 1954 amended its shareholder proposal rule (now rule
14a-8) to require inclusion of shareholder proposals that are "a proper
subject for action for security holders" under "the laws of the issuer's
domicile."' 187 As Professor Loss has observed:
[T]he Commission probably has little choice under the statute. When the
state law is clear that a particular matter is for the directors alone, that
would seem to be decisive. If Congress had intended to give the Commis-
sion power to reallocate functions between the two corporate organs, so
revolutionary a federal intervention would presumably have been more
clearly expressed.' 88
He added in a footnote that "[t]his would approach federal incorporation
in all but name."'8 9
183. Id. at 518.
184. See L. Loss, supra note 175, at 537.
185. 163 F.2d at 518 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
186. See, eg., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1555
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
187. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1986).
188. L. Loss, supra note 175, at 530.
189. Id. at 530 n.65.
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A similar debate concerning possible federal substantive regulation of
intrafirm relationships arose in connection with rule lOb-5,19 the broad
antifraud provision promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the statutory
authority of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, to prohibit fraudulent or de-
ceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.191
During the 1960's and 70's, some federal courts gave this rule an expan-
sive reach, reading rule 1Ob-5 to cover not only misrepresentations, but
also fraud in the broader sense of unfair conduct by corporate fiducia-
ries.192 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,193 a 1977 decision written
by Justice White, the author of the MITE decision, the Supreme Court
squashed such an expansive reading. The Court held that a plaintiff
must show a deceptive or manipulative act (not just unfairness) in order
to invoke section 10(b). 194
In what is perhaps its clearest indication to date of the interrelation-
ship of federal securities law and state corporate law, the Court said:
absent a clear indication of Congressional intent we are reluctant to federal-
ize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with trans-
actions in securities. . . . "Corporations are creatures of state law and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding
that except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders state law will govern the internal af-
fairs of the corporation."'195
Since Santa Fe several federal courts of appeals have interpreted "de-
ception" to give a federal remedy to shareholders who were mistreated
by their managers.1 96 These courts narrowly interpret Santa Fe to ex-
clude from rule lOb-5 only those cases having both deficiencies present in
Santa Fe-that is, they deal with corporate mismanagement and lack any
deception. If corporate mismangement is accomplished by deception, a
190. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1986). See generally Ribstein, supra note 11.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
192. See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, judgment
vacated and case remanded to determine mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Green v. Santa Fe Indus.
Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Bryan v. Brock &Blevins Co.,
343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd on state law grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
193. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
194. Id. at 479.
195. Id. at 479 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
196. See. e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama
Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied. 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979);
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069) (1978); Wright v.
Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
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federal remedy accrues. If the challenged transaction involves an act by
a corporation,-e.g., the managers cause the corporation to sell corpo-
rate stock to themselves or their friends for too low a price-the neces-
sary deception is that of the corporation. Courts have found material
deception of the corporation when those who caused the corporation to
act had a conflict of interest and did not disclose the true facts to share-
holders (even if shareholders were not required to act for the corpora-
tion), so long as the disclosure would have enabled minority shareholders
to protect themselves by seeking an injunction to prevent the corporate
action or by taking other protective action such as filing for an appraisal
after a fundamental corporate change. 197
These cases have been criticized vigorously by some judges and com-
mentators as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Santa
Fe.198 These cases effectively provide a federal remedy to a shareholder
harmed by a faithless fiduciary. But even as so extended, the federal rule
lOb-5 cause of action depends on the shareholder-manager relationship
created by state law. If state law provides no substantive right against
the directors, no federal disclosure obligation arises. A federal remedy
exists only if a state remedy also exists. 199 In effect, these courts interpret
the disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws to supplement and
safeguard shareholder rights against directors provided by state law."°
197. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978);
but see Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
198. See, eg., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskil, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979) (Skelton, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980). See also R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS, 951-52 (5th ed.
1982) (criticizing decisions such as those cited supra note 196 for standing Santa Fe on its head);
Gorman, At the Intersection of Supreme Avenue and Circuit Street, The Focus of Section 10(b) and
Santa Fe's Footnote 14, 7 J. CORP. L. 199 (1982).
199. See Kidwell ex rel Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Indeed under
the Goldberg rationale, it is precisely because there are state law remedies for the shareholders that
deception can be found.").
200. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980) ("That the harm to
plaintiff from the omission was deprivation of a state remedy in no sense diminishes the federal
interest in preventing the omission and thereby ensuring full disclosure of all material information in
securities transactions."). But see Dixon v. Ladish Co., 597 F. Supp. 20, 28 (E.D. Wis. 1984), aff'd
sub nom. Kademian v. Ladish, 792 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1986) ("failure to disclose facts which would
alert investors to nothing other than a breach of fiduciary duty is insufficient to invoke the federal
remedy"); see generally Lashbrooke, The Alternative Action Requirement: The Derailment of Santa
Fe, 1981 DUKE L.J. 963; Roitre, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the
Federal Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 781, 807-09 (1982).
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The tender offer cases go further by establishing substantive rights for
shareholders against their managers. For example, Judge Sofaer in the
district court decision in Data Probe, held that Congress had imposed
two duties on tender offer participants: first, disclosure, and second, "to
refrain from any conduct that unduly impedes the shareholders' exercise
of the decision-making prerogative guaranteed to them by Congress."
20 1
In finding prerogatives granted by Congress instead of state law, the
judge seems to have found a substantive federal right. His reasoning par-
allels that used in the Transamerica case-why would Congress require
disclosure if it did not intend for shareholders to be able to use that dis-
closure effectively? Yet in both the proxy and rule lOb-5 areas, Congress
and the courts have recognized that these federal rights facilitate the ef-
fective exercise of shareholder rights against managers derived from state
law, but do not displace the relationship determined by state law.2 ° 2
A third area in which federal law affects shareholder rights against
management, albeit to a lesser extent than the two areas previously men-
tioned, is derivative suits. Such litigation occurs when a shareholder sues
on behalf of the corporation after the board has refused to sue. Often the
defendants in such suits are insiders who would be unlikely to cause the
corporation to sue themselves. Derivative suits, like proxy fights, tender
offers and other market mechanisms, permit shareholders to monitor
their managers.2 3 The effectiveness of derivative suits in this regard has
been controversial. There have been recurring proposals for change by
those who feel the cost of this form of monitoring exceeds the benefits
received. 2°
Federal regulation of derivative suits has been limited to procedural
rules governing the conduct of such suits in federal court.2 °5 The federal
courts apply state substantive laws regarding the relative rights within
the corporation of shareholders and directors. If state law permits direc-
tors to terminate derivative suits, federal courts will not interfere with
that balancing of the shareholder-director relationship, unless that dis-
201. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1545 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
722 F,2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
202. See Statement of Joseph R. Wright, ADMINISTRATION VIEWS ON CORPORATE TAKE-
OVERS, at 25 ("the task of identifying and controlling potentially abusive conduct by target manage-
ment has traditionally and properly been the subject of state, not federal law.").
203. See Coffee, supra note 21.
204. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (discussing securities-
for-expenses statutes).
205 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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missal would violate a federal policy.2 ° 6 This lack of substantive rules
regarding derivative suits is thus consistent with other areas in which
federal law regulates intrafirm relationships.
These examples of federal restraint might be less relevant if Congress
viewed tender offers as having an effect that called for a more intrusive
federal approach. Judge Sofaer put the argument this way:
A different form of protection is necessary under the Williams Act than
under the 1934 Act because tender offer battles, even in a context of full
disclosure, create extreme pressures and may involve tactics which distort
or even abort the investment decision. Furthermore, whereas available
state court remedies might be sufficient to warrant refusing to recognize a
federal claim for "unfairness" under Section 10(b), a federal, injunctive
remedy is a necessary adjunct to the Williams Act goal of preventing abuses
of the tender offer procedure before they damage shareholders undermining
or aborting the tender offer process.207
Yet, it is hard to find evidence in the legislative history of such a dra-
matic change in the relationship of federal law to state regulation of in-
trafirm relationships. The congressional decision to include substantive
regulation of the market transaction between the target shareholder and
the bidder (by including requirements as to pro rata acceptance of ten-
ders and withdrawal rights for shareholders who tender) does not neces-
sarily imply a congressional intention to provide new substantive rights
for shareholders against their managers when that approach is contrary
to almost all previous federal regulation of intrafirm activity. The House
and Senate hearings focused on filling a gap in the federal regulation not
changing the face of federal regulation. Senator Williams' initial bill, in-
troduced in 1965, had been written as an amendment to section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act. It was later moved to section 14 after an SEC memoran-
dum suggested the proxy section would be a more appropriate place for
the tender offer rules.20 As further evidence of the more limited reach
intended for the Williams Act, the legislative history contains several ref-
erences to various defensive tactics that management might take.20 9
206. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 64 (2d Cir, 1980).
207. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1544 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984). Judge Winter, in his previous aca-
demic writing suggested a similar point, that federal law was needed for regulation of market of
corporate control in a way that it was not needed for other intrafirm relationships. See Winter, supra
note 164.
208. See Memorandum of the SEC to the Committee on Banking and Currency, US. Senate on S.
2731. 89th Congress, reprinted in 112 CONG. REC. 19003 (1966).
209. See Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 57, 115, 125, 145 (statements of Professors Hays,
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Thus, while Congress clearly decided not to impose a new federal law
that delayed the tender offer process to the benefit of management, it did
not forbid directors from using their authority under state law to under-
take those activities, (except in those situations in which management
initiated a tender offer for its own shares).2"'
IV. CONCLUSION
Broader federal regulation may be necessary or appropriate to deal
with the possible harm to shareholders arising from defensive tactics that
interfere with the market for corporate control and from the inability of
states to deal with that interference. But the vulnerability of sharehold-
ers to improper dealings by their managers has been the traditional con-
cern of state law. Federal law has been involved in this area for at least
fifty years but has always taken care not to supplant state regulation of
intrafirm relationships.
In light of this prior history, any change in the role of federal law
should not be lightly inferred. Congress, not the courts, should declare
any such extension. The substantive regulation of market transactions
between a bidder and target company shareholders in the Williams Act
Mundheim & Kaplan) and Appendix II (article listing defensive tactics); House Hearings, supra note
113, at 20 (statement of SEC Chairman Cohen); H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976)
(in connection with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 listing defensive
tactics that may be taken and referring to congressional intent to prevent longer delay from being
used to engage in such tactics, but no suggestion of prohibition of tactics themselves); 122 CONG.
REc. 30877 (1976) (statement by Rep. Rodino, to the same effect listing as possible tactics "abolish-
ing cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defensive merger quickly, incorporating in a state with an
anti-takeover statute, or negotiating costly lifetime employment contracts for incumbent
management.").
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982); SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5; cf. Senate Hearings,
supra note 23, at 19 (statement of SEC Chairman Cohen listing forms of efforts management may
use to discourage shareholders from tendering and proposed regulation on corporate repurchase and
disclosure of management's views). See also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4 & 240.14d-10 (1986) (which
prohibit discriminatory tender offers by management, such as the one implemented by Unocal to
fight off a hostile tender offer from Boone Pickens, described in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). A federal court earlier had refused to invalidate such action under
the Williams Act finding that Congress did not intend to substantively regulate tender offers. See
Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1985). The SEC's authority to implement
such a rule has been questioned. See, eg., Fiflis, supra note 25, at 323. The SEC responded to
arguments that the rule would preempt state corporate law by stating that those persons "fail to
recognize that Congress made that decision when it enacted Section 13(e)." SEC Release No. 33-
6653, at 16 (Sept. 4, 1986), reprinted in [1986-87] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 84,016, at 88,190.
While such a rule clearly affects shareholder-management relations, its focus on a market transaction
between the two distingiushes this federal regulation from more general federal regulation of share-
holder-management relations.
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does not necessarily imply that Congress also intended to adopt a policy
giving shareholders substantive federal protection against their managers
beyond rights available under state law. This issue of the federalization
of corporation law deserves rigorous debate, but it is an issue that judicial
decisions applying the Williams Act as yet have ignored.
POSTSCRIPT
Since this article was submitted for publication, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corporation of America, and ren-
dered its decision. The Court's decision upholding the Indiana control
share acquisitions statute against both preemption and commerce clause
challenges clearly limits the reach of the reasoning set out in the majority
and plurality opinions in Edgar v. MITE Corp. and affirms a broader
realm for the operation of state corporation law. The Court's rejection of
a broad view of the purpose of the Williams Act that would preempt "a
variety of state corporate laws of hereto unquestioned validity", likely
will resolve the conflict discussed in part IIIB of this Article in favor of
all the state laws discussed at that point. This includes the other second
generation statutes enacted by the various states and the additional stat-
utes that undoubtedly will be enacted in the wake of this decision.
What the Court did not do, however, is to present a coherent account
of the overall division of responsibility between the federal and state
realms. This article does present such an account, arguing that Congress
has left intrafirm relationships to be regulated by state law, while it has
retained for the national government the primary role in the regulation of
economic activity occurring across markets. The holding and reasoning
of the CTS case are entirely consistent with this article's analysis. The
Court's decision shifts the focus of debate to Congress, which should ex-
pressly consider the federalism aspects of future tender offer legislation.
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